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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FROM STATE AND LOCAL TAXESt
LT. COLONEL ROBERT 0. ROLLMAN, HQ, AFSC*
The legal maxim that "states cannot tax the Federal Gov-
ernment," as decreed years ago in McCulloch v. Maryland' is
no longer the panacea for all problems arising from attempts
by the states or their political subdivisions to impose taxes on
operations of the Federal Government or its instrumentali-
ties. Justice Marshall's 1819 pronouncement in McCulloch is,
in most instances, the beginning, rather than the end, for the
law has followed a devious, and not always clear, route, in its
meanderings over the years. As Justice Jackson said in U. S.
v. Allegheny Co., infra, some 125 years after McCulloch,
"Looking backward it is easy to see that the line between the
taxable and the immune has been drawn by an unsteady
hand." The present status of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, having its genesis in McCulloch insofar as the area
under discussion is concerned, and as it applies to the Federal
Government, has aptly been referred to as a "legal myth".!
A proper resolution of the problem herein being considered
must take into regard not only the rationale of McCulloch,
which, although antiquated, will be seen to be still applicable
in some few instances, but to the incidence of the tax (to
whom does the taxing authority, by statute or decision, look
for the tax in the first instance) ; whether or not the tax is
discriminatory (does the tax apply equally to all within the
same class) ; and, to territorial immunities (which sovereign,
the state or the Federal Government, exercises legislative
jurisdiction over the property sought to be taxed, or on which
the property sought to be taxed is then located).
In its heyday, the McCulloch rationale, wherein the doctrine
t This article is also printed in 3 JAG Bull. 10 (No. 6 1961).
* The author is a graduate of the Dickinson School of Law and a mem-
ber of the Pennsylvania Bar. He was formerly Chief, Tax Branch, Tax and
Litigation Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, United States
Air Force.
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). Justice Marshall ruled that Congress,
as a means of carrying into effect its sovereign powers, could incorporate
a bank and establish its branches within any Btate. Having done so, the
state was constitutionally prohibited from taxing that branch. Moreover, it
was decreed that the states have no right to tax any of the constitutional
means employed by the Federal Government to execute its constitutional
powers.
2. Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-
A Legal Myth, 3 Okla. L. Rev. 131 (1950)
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of sovereign immunity was applied to government "opera-
tions", was extended to immunize real property, income of
Federal employees, lessees of real and personal government
property, and a variety of other Federal interests, from state
and local taxation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity re-
ceived its first setback in 1937 with the decisions in James v.
Dravo Contracting Co.' and Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commis-
sion,' and has been on the wane ever since. In those cases, al-
though the taxes were upheld, the court discussed an "'econo-
mic burden" test under which a tax might be invalid if the
financial burden was upon the Federal Government. In the
case of Alabama v. King and Boozer,' decided in 1941, the Su-
preme Court apparently rejected such a test in upholding a
tax on the sale of lumber to a cost-plus-fixed fee construction
contractor who was building an Army Camp, even though the
economic burden of the tax ultimately fell upon the Federal
Government. In 1944, in U. S. v. Allegheny Co.,' the Supreme
Court devolved what has been referred to by some experts in
the field as the "legal incidence" test.' In that case, a state
tax on the Mesta Machine Co. plant, enhanced in value for tax
purposes by reason of government owned machinery in the
plant, was held invalid inasmuch as the "legal taxpayer" was
the U. S. Actually, the court recognized that the county was
attempting to tax Federally owned property in the possession
of a government contractor (Mesta Machine Co.) and applied
the sovereign immunity doctrine. That test was applied by
the court in Kern-Limerick v. Scurlock,' in holding a gross-
receipts (sales) tax on purchases by a Federal contractor in-
valid where the contract made him a purchasing agent for
the United States. The court distinguished its earlier decision
in King and Boozer, by saying in that case the incidence of
the tax fell upon an independent contractor, whereas in the
instant case, the incidence was upon an agent of the United
States. It should be noted, for reasons that are here of no
moment, that the Defense Establishment has, since 1955, re-
frained from specifically designating contractors as agents in
contracts written under its auspices. Notwithstanding, in
3. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
4. 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
5. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
6. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
7. Van Cleve, States' Rights & Fed. Solvency, 2 Wis. L. Rev. (Mar.
1959).
8. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
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Nov. 1959, a U. S. District Court, in the case of U. S. and
Dupont v. Livingston,' found agency to exist under the terms
of the contract even though such relationship was not specifi-
cally spelled out in the contract. Be that as it may, the "legal
incidence" test announced in Allegheny, which seemingly
stood for the proposition that government owned property
was not taxable wherever found, had a short life. In 1953,
the Supreme Court, in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans," up-
held the validity of a state privilege tax on Esso, occasioned
by its storage of gasoline owned by the United States, even
though it was shown that the United States had contractually
obligated itself to reimburse the contractor for any state tax
liability incurred. The court distinguished Allegheny by say-
ing it was the government property taxed in that instance,
while here it was the privilege of storing government property
that was taxed. The court concluded by saying that although
the tax in Esso may "burden the United States financially...
this has been no fatal flaw [since James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., supra] ."
In a series of cases announced on 3 March 1958, the U. S.
Supreme Court went even further in decimating the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, and for all intents and purposes, repu-
diated the theory prescribed in Allegheny. U. S. Borg Warner
v. City of Detroit"1 and U. S. & Continental Motors v. Town-
ship of Muskegan'- concerned the application of a 1953 Michi-
gan statute providing that when tax exempt real property
is used by a private person in a business conducted for profit,
the private person is subject to taxation to the same extent
as if he were the owner of the property. Both cases involved
government contractors occupying defense plants, one under
a lease and the other under a permit which could be terminat-
ed at will. The U. S. Supreme Court upheld the imposition of
the tax, saying the constitutional immunity of the Federal
Government from state taxation was not violated and that the
state statute was not discriminatory nor was the statute dis-
criminatorily administered. All of this occurred notwithstand-
ing that, for years, the Federal Government has reimbursed
its contractors for the costs of possessory interest taxes. It is
interesting to note that defense contractors, at the instigation
9. 179 F. Supp. 9; Affd per curiam, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
10. 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
11. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
12. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
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of the military departments, have again initiated litigation in
Michigan for purposes of questioning, inter alia, whether or
not the statute is discriminatory because property of state-
supported educational institutions (of which considerable
realty is owned and leased to private interests, including valu-
able down-town properties in the state capital at Lansing and
a high percentage of the vast Willow Run complex on the out-
skirts of Detroit) and property used by way of concession in
or relative to the use of a public airport, park, market, fair
ground, or similar property available to the general public,
are not subject to taxation under the statutes.
In the third of these 1958 cases, City of Detroit v. Murray
Corp. of America," the court upheld a tax imposed on Murray,
an Air Force subcontractor, on the basis of work in process
and inventory, title to which was in the Federal Government
on tax day. The court, having earlier that day upheld the
possessory interest taxation on government owned real pro-
perty, found no constitutional impediment to now permitting
a possessory interest tax on Government owned personal prop-
erty. Unlike the real property situation, the Michigan statutes
did not specifically authorize such tax, but it was imposed
pursuant to the usual personal property tax statute levying
the tax on the property. The author Justice for the majority,
in commenting on the disparity between the statutes, made a
rather startling statement when he said, "It is true that the
particular Michigan taxing statutes involved here do not ex-
pressly state that the person in possession is taxed 'for the
privilege of using or possessing' personal property, but to
strike down a tax on the possessor because of such verbal
omission would only prove a victory for empty formalism.
And empty formalisms are too shadowy a basis for invalidat-
ing state tax laws . . . In the circumstances of this case the
state could obviate such grounds for invalidity by merely
adding a few words to its statutes." Subsequently, the State
of Michigan did just that. The confusion was compounded, a
week or so later, when the U. S. Supreme Court affirmed,
per curiam, the fourth in the quartet of March 1958 decisions.
This was the case of American Motors Corp. v. City of Ken-
osha' which was factually similar to Murray. The one note-
worthy exception was that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
13. 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
14. 356 U.S. 21 (1958).
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found the contract ineffective for purposes of vesting title in
the Federal Government, at least for tax purposes, whereas
in the Murray case, the court assumed that the United States
had full title to the property. There can be little more than
speculation as to the basis on which the Court affirmed the
American Motors case. Subsequently, the California Supreme
Court, in two cases tried and decided together, General Dyna-
mics Corp. and Aerojet General Corp. v. County of Los An-
geles," veered from the path recently followed by the U. S.
Supreme Court in refusing to interpret the provisions of its
statutes in the same way that similar provisions were inter-
preted in Murray. The California Court said in pertinent part,
"... we cannot sustain a property tax here on the ground that
the legislature could constitutionally provide for the levy of
a tax of equal amount under a different scheme." More re-
cently, in The Martin Company v. State Tax Commission," the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that Maryland tax laws did
not provide for taxation of Martin's right to use and possess
personal property of the United States. The court said, "Our
holding, we believe, is in accord with that of the Supreme
Court of California with regard to similar tax statutes of that
state involved in the General Dynamics case . . .The statu-
tory history and previous construction of [our laws], are im-
portant factors in leading us to the view that the holding of
the California Supreme Court is more persuasive than the
construction of the Michigan tax laws involved in the Murray
Corporation case and its companion cases as to our statutes."
Today, the United States conducts much of its business
through a vast number of private parties. The trend in the
U. S. Supreme Court has been to reject immunizing these pri-
vate parties from non-discriminatory state taxes, as a matter
of constitutional law, even though the United States bears
the economic brunt of the tax, indirectly in some instances, by
inclusion in price, and more directly in many instances, by
reimbursement to the contractor as an item of cost.
The U. S. Supreme Court has not been reluctant to point out
the alternative to the foregoing, for in U. S. v. Detroit, reiter-
ated in Detroit v. Murray, supra, it said, "Of course this is not
to say that Congress, acting within the proper scope of its
power, cannot confer immunity by statute where it does not
15. 330 P.2d 794 (1958).
16. 171 A.2d 479 (1961).
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exist constitutionally. Wise and flexible adjustment of inter-
governmental tax immunity calls for political and economic
consideration of the greatest difficulty and delicacy. Such
complex problems are ones which Congress is best qualified
to resolve." Congress has legislated rather extensively in this
area. Most widely known among the immunizing statutes is
the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act which protects ac-
tive duty military personnel from income, personal property,
automobile license fees, and certain other type of taxes im-
posed by a state in which they are not domiciled.' Originally
a cloak of immunity was thrown around contractors for the
Atomic Energy Commission." Although upheld by the U. S.
Supreme Court in Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co.,"9 the immun-
ity was subsequently modified by the Congress in authorizing
payments by the Atomic Energy Commission to the "state
and local governments in lieu of property taxes."'" Family
housing projects built by private corporations, under the
Capehart program, have been exempt from state and local
taxes, and limits had been set on the amount of such taxes
which could have been imposed with respect to similar proj-
ects operated by private parties under the Wherry Program'
(the acquisition by the Air Force of the title to most, if not
all, Wherry projects, has rendered the latter provision one of
academic interest at this time). Conversely, Congress had
subjected Reconstruction Finance Corporation real property
to state and local taxation." The abolition of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation and subsequent transfer of its prop-
erty to other governmental agencies had the effect of remov-
ing the property from state and local tax rolls. The havoc
which such action worked upon state and local fiscal plans
was recognized by the Congress when payments in lieu of
taxes for sucn transferred real property were authorized.'
Also, in the "Hayden-Cartwright Act" and the "Buck Act"
amendment thereto, Congress has permitted the imposition of
state and local sales, use, income and gasoline taxes in Federal
areas' although preserving the immunity of the United
States, its instrumentalities, and authorized purchases there-
17. 50 U.S.C. § § 501, 574.
18. Sec. 9(b) Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 765.
19. 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2208.
21. See. 511, Housing Act of 1956, 42 U.S.C. § 1594, note.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 607.
23. 40 U.S.C. § 521.
24. 4 U.S.C. § 104-110.
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from, from all save the latter.' A bill has been introduced in
the present session of Congress which would extend the pro-
visions of the "Buck Act" to personal property located within
a Federal enclave.'
Except for mere mention here, inasmuch as the subject is a
rather exhaustive one within itself, immunity from taxation
extends to areas over which the Federal Government exer-
cises exclusive legislative jurisdiction. That concept, embodied
in the doctrine of territorial immunity, has recently, although
most assuredly not for the first time,' been applied by a Texas
District Court in General Dynamics Corp. v. The Board of
Equalization of the City and Independent School District of
Fort Worth, et al.' Therein, it was held that U. S. owned prop-
erty in the possession of a contractor and a contractor owned
property, located within a Federal enclave, was beyond the
purview of local taxing authorities. On 26 July 1961 the Texas
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error noting that no re-
versible error was shown in the opinion below.
While the courts frequently spoke of discrimination, little
was done, until recently, to define what was and what was not,
such discrimination as would vitiate a tax. In the case of
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District,'
decided 23 February 1960, the U. S. Supreme Court struck
down the! school district assessment against Phillips for the
years 1949 through 1954. The object of the tax was industrial
property leased by Phillips, from the Army, for purely com-
mercial purposes. The tax was assessed under a 1950 Texas
law which provided for a tax, measured by the full valueof
the property, on one who uses or occupies Federal property
for profit. In comparing the taxes on other exempt property
in Texas with the tax on a lessee of the Federal Government,
it was ascertained that lessees of other tax exempt property,
such as that owned by the state, were taxed only if the lease
was for three years or more, and the assessment was based
only on the value of the leasehold. In an attempt to bring it-
self within the permissible classification features of previous
decisions, in other words, justify the discrimination, the state
25. 4 U.S.C: § 107.
26. HMR. 5362 (87th Cong., 1st Sess.).
27. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the' Study of Juris-
diction Over Federal areas within the states, Part II, a text of the Law of
Legislative Jurisdiction, June 1957, Chapter VII, contains discussion and
listing of cases.
28. District Ct. of Tarrant Co., Tex., 67th Jud. Dist., No. 9983-C.
29. 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
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argued that: (1) the state can collect in rent what it loses in
taxes, (2) the state may legitimately foster its own interests,
and, (3) the greater magnitude of Federal leasing has a
greater impact on the local economy. The court rejected the
argument in toto. The court concluded that the discrimination
was apparent, saying further, "where the taxation of the pri-
vate use of the Government's property is concerned the Gov-
ernment's interests must be weighed in the balance. Accord-
ingly, it does not seem too much to require that the State
treat those who deal with the Government as well as it treats
those with whom it deals itself."
In February 1961, in U. S. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.
v. Dept. of Revenue of the State of Illinois, et al,'" a three
judge U. S. District Court enjoined the state from levying
and/or collecting its retailer's occupation (sales) tax from
those contractors doing business with the United States inas-
much as the tax did not reciprocate the exemption granted to
retailers doing business with the state and its political sub-
divisions. The court did not question, in fact it recognized,
that the state legislature has the power to grant an exemp-
tion according to its views of public policy, subject only to
the limitation that the exemption and the classification upon
which it is based be reasonable and not arbitrary. However,
the court said, "In our view . . . a retailer who deals with the
Federal Government falls within the same class as a retailer
who deals with the State of Illinois. If an exemption is made
from the general classification of retailers who sell tangible
personal property on the legally justifiable basis of dealing
with the State of Illinois, it is because such retailer deals with
a governmental entity. By exempting a retailer who deals
with the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, the
legislature has subdivided retailers who transact business
with governmental entities into two divisions-those who deal
with the State of Illinois and its subdivisions and those who
deal with the United States. To be valid, such an exemption
must fall alike on all similarly situated and must include re-
tailers who deal with the Federal Government." The state has
petitioned the U. S. Supreme Court for review, but in view of
the decision in Phillips, it seems unlikely that the District
Court ruling will be reversed. Although the decision in
Phillips concerned itself with a property tax, as differentiated
30. 191 F. Supp. 723 '(1961).
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from a sales tax in Olin Mathieson, the distinction is one with-
out a real difference, for the Court's statements in the former
most assuredly apply to the entire spectrum of state-local
taxes. An interesting aftermath to the Olin Mathieson deci-
sion was the action by the Illinois Supreme Court in People
ex rel Holland Coal Co., v. Isaacs,' wherein the exemptions in
the Retailers' Occupation (Sales) Tax Act on sales to the
State and local governments and on sales for charitable, reli-
gious or educational purposes were considered. In holding the
Phillips case controlling, the Court said, "The exemption pro-
visions have failed to include the Federal Government within
the class to which it belongs, and therefore, this works an
unconstitutional discrimination against the Federal Govern-
ment. For that reason we hold that [all] the exemption pro-
visions of the [acts] in question are unconstitutional and
void." Thus, it would appear that sales to the Federal Govern-
ment might again be taxable, since the constitutional objec-
tion in the Olin Mathieson case is no longer available to the
Federal Government. However, a petition for rehearing in the
Holland Coal Co. case has been filed with the Illinois Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, the Illinois Department of Revenue has
refrained from collecting the tax in sales to contractors for
the Federal Government,' as indeed it would be obliged to do
under the existing restraining order (,Olin Mathieson, supra).
A motion to have the injunction removed was denied by the
Federal District Court on the basis that the court no longer
had jurisdiction since the matter was on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
The two cases, immediately preceding, pertain to discrimin-
ation apparent in the text of the state statutes. In the City of
Detroit and Continental Motors cases, supra, the U. S. 'Su-
preme Court made it abundantly clear that unlawful dis-
crimination might also result from the manner in which tax
laws were administered.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it may be concluded: The Federal Gov-
ernment and/or its property is constitutionally immune from
direct state and local tax impositions. Government owned
property in the possession of a contractor and contractor
31. I1. Sup. Ct., 10 May 1961, CCH State Tax Reporter, Il. 200-200.
32. CCH State Tax Review, 12 June 1961, Vol. 22, No. 24.
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owned property, located within an area over which the Fed-
eral Government exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction, is
beyond the reach of state and local taxing authorities. Con-
gress may waive, or, conversely, confer, immunity. Persons
dealing with the Federal Government may be subjected to
taxation by reason of their dealings with the Federal Govern-
ment (sales, use, etc., tax) or possession of Federally owned
real or personal property, (the latter subject to its being
without a Federal enclave, supra). The measure of the tax
may be the full value of the property. This is so notwith-
standing that the Federal Government may, and usually does,
bear the economic burden of the tax. In every instance, how-
ever, the tax may not unlawfully discriminate against the
Federal Government or those with whom it deals.
